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 EMERGING DIMENSIONS OF DECENTRALIZATION DEBATE  
IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION  
 
The subnational political units, in the age of globalisation are emerging as the principal actors in the global 
economy. With this the location or site of governance is changing. Thus the need is to situate the debate on 
decentralization in context of globalization. It has been argued that ‘how decentralization is designed’ depends on 
‘why decentralization is being carried out’. 
    
Introduction: 
 
Glocalization seems to be a problematic term. But this is the term that best captures the essence of the 
emerging worldwide phenomenon where globalization and localization are simultaneously 
transforming the development landscape.  The term has its roots in the Japanese term dochakuka which 
first appeared in the late 1980s in articles by Japanese economists in the Harvard Business Review. The 
term originally meant adapting farming technique to one’s own local condition. The idea was later 
adopted to refer to global-localization.  According to the dictionary meaning, the term ‘glocal’ and the 
process noun ‘glocalization’ are “formed by telescoping global and local to make a blend” (The Oxford 
Dictionary of New Words, 1991:134). Roland Robertson, conceptualized glocalization as “the 
universalization of particularization and the particularization of universalism” (Robertson, 1992:100). 
Khondker (1994) expressed it as a process combining the twin processes of macro-localization and 
micro-globalization. Giddens (2000) however conceptualizes the relationship between the global and 
the local a little differently. Globalization he argues provokes revival of local cultural identities 
(Giddens, 2000:31). Thus in his view ‘local’ is the provider of the response to the forces that are ‘global’. 
For Ritzer (2004) globalization is glocalization plus grobalization. Grobalization refers to growth 
imperatives forcing the “organizations and nations to expand globally and to impose themselves on the 
local” (2004:xiii). While the term grobalization, is bereft of any conceptual underpinnings or theoretical 
construct, it does reinforce the fact that “Globalization” and “localization” (the growing economic and 
political power of subnational entities) have become the most important trends of the new century.  
Earlier in 1990 the U.S Agency for International Development had identified such trends as “the 
establishment of open markets and the movement toward more accountable and democratic 
governance.” (USAID, 1990 p1).  However, the WB report (1999) adds that this is happening at the cost 
of the nation state. Thus the global economy has unleashed economic and political factors 
strengthening both global and local pressures at the expense of the traditional nation state. Does such a 
trend indicate a movement towards beginning of the end of the nation states and rise of regional 
economies?  
 
Kahler and Lake (2003) and Michael J Hiscox (2003) argue that globalization- defined narrowly as 
“economic integration in international system” has created pressures for relocation of decision making 
authority away from the state. Thus there is a change in location or site of governance. States are either 
delegating more responsibility over decision making “upwards” to supranational institutions or 
devolving decision making powers “downwards” to subnational political units. This kind of analysis 
suggests that as a consequence of globalization, national economic sovereignty is weakening while 
local economies, what Ohamae (1995) calls “citistates” are becoming the principal actors in the global 
economy. 
 
In fact central governments around the world are decentralizing fiscal, political and administrative 
responsibilities to lower level governments and to the private sector. A large number of developing and 
transitional countries have embarked on some form of decentralization programmes. This trend is 
 coupled with a growing interest in the “role of civil society and the private sector as partners to the 
governments in seeking new ways of service delivery” (UNO, 1996 P.7). With this it becomes essential 
to situate the debate on decentralization in context of glocalization. Till mid 1980s the major debate 
was: To decentralize or not? Today this is no longer relevant. The question at the center of 
decentralization debate today is: How to decentralize?   
 
There is no simple and straightforward answer to this question. There are competing notions of 
decentralization and competing approaches for designing decentralization. In fact various types of 
decentralization viz. political, administrative, fiscal, and market decentralization can be designed in 
various forms and combinations. Thus in the age of Glocalization the issue of decentralization has 
emerged as one of the central themes of international policy debates.  
 
I. The Dynamics of Decentralization in the Age of Glocalization 
 
The debate on decentralization since 1990s can be seen as a final stage of the dialectical movement of 
the development paradigm (Sharma, 2005a:2). Till mid 1980s there was a trend in favour of more 
economic role for the state (this paradigm gave rise to the extreme forms of centralization). The 
centralized decision making was seen as a way to ‘rationalize scarce resources and to depoliticize the 
masses’ while decentralization was viewed as likely to heighten cleavages; political, radical, ethnic, and 
religious. The second phase emerged in late 1980s and early 1990s accompanying an obsession with 
curtailing the economic role of the state and reducing the size of the public sector, as these were seen as 
major causes for financial crisis in the developing countries. The public sector far from being regarded 
as engine of development came to be perceived as an obstacle to it. There was a fascination with the 
private sector. (Privatization is seen as extreme form of decentralization). By mid 1990s, however, a 
renewed appreciation of the public sector’s development role began to emerge. Economic development 
literature has over the past decade re-discovered the importance of public sector that is sub-national in 
focus. 
 
It may be noted that decentralization debate in the age of glocalization is not static. Decentralization is 
no longer put against centralization. The debate, far from focusing on the straw men of centralization 
vs decentralization, focuses on the complementary role of the two. Final aim is not to decentralize just 
for sake of it but to ensure good governance. The context of glocalization has pronounced the dilemma 
of balancing the contrasting forces of centralization and decentralization (see Sharma, 2005b: 175-76). 
Decentralization is no longer an alternative to centralization. Both are needed.  The complementary 
roles of national and subnational actors should be determined by analyzing the most effective ways 
and means of achieving a desired objective. It just does not make much sense to hope for any sort of 
bottom-line presumption in favour of “more centralization” or “more decentralization.”   
 
Research shows that glocalization is generating tendencies in both directions (centralization and 
decentralization) with the aim of providing good governance and a stable, secure and just government. 
It has been argued that centralizing tendencies are likely to be more salient in countries like the United 
States where intrastate authority was initially more decentralized, while decentralizing tendencies are 
likely to be more salient in states that were initially more centralized like China and India. 
Glocalization is creating incentives for sub national governments to play a more active role in attracting 
foreign investment, promoting trade, providing infrastructure and enhancing human capital yet on the 
other hand, it is promoting various forms of centralization by increasing the importance of 
macroeconomic policy levers, especially monetary policy and central banks.  
 
 International integration of markets is facilitating decentralization by reducing the economic costs of 
smallness (Alesina & Spolaore 1997, Bolton & Roland 1997).  Technological changes and global 
integration of factor markets have changed the size of government needed to manage economic 
systems. Now an increasing number of public services can be efficiently provided by decentralized and 
often private organizations (World Bank 1995).  Further, as argued by Schneidr (2003), free trade, 
international treaties and loan conditions have led central governments to choose or be forced to 
abdicate their traditional roles and leave critical functions to non-central government entities if they 
were to be performed at all.  Synder (1999) for instance shows how Mexican state governments stepped 
in to provide regulatory frameworks where the central government abdicated its role in coffee 
production.  
  
On the other hand international integration of markets has also increased demands for a) fiscal 
stabilization covering the entire country and b) insurance for regions adversely affected by asymmetric 
economic shocks. Both fiscal stabilization and inter-regional risk-sharing require a pooling of economic 
resources at the center (see Garrett and Rodden, 2003). 
 
This implies that glocalization is generating tendencies towards supranational governance and 
centralization on one hand and for localization and decentralization on the other. The challenge is to 
design ‘optimal decentralization’. The right degree of decentralization, in words of Wildasin (1996) 
depends on what it is we are considering decentralizing and on the particular economic, historical, 
political and other circumstances within which decentralization is contemplated. In fact success of 
decentralization depends on its design (Sharma, 2005 c). While an appropriately structured 
decentralization improves the efficiency and responsiveness of the public sector and accommodates 
potentially explosive political forces, inappropriately designed decentralization threatens economic and 
political stability and disrupts the delivery of the public services. Here is important to note that the 
notion of appropriateness is relative and context specific. What is appropriate in one context may be 
inappropriate in another. How decentralization is designed depends on what are the goals that are 
sought to be accomplished? And why policy makers think decentralization is desirable? This debate is 
the subject matter of next section.  
 
II. Why Decentralize? 
 
How decentralization is designed depends on the goals that policy makers seek to achieve. These goals 
can differ from country to country. Within a multilevel governance structure, national and subnational 
political officials may seek decentralization for different purposes. Politics, broadly speaking, is a 
process of determining “who will get what, when and how”. In context of decentralization, the Central-
Subcentral political bargaining over decentralization rules will determine whose version of 
decentralization would be implemented. Differences in objectives or rationale behind decentralization 
can be understood as follows: 
 
(a) Perspectives on Desirability of Decentralization 
 
The debate here is why governments should decentralize: (a) To bring the government closer to the 
people or (b) To split sovereignty between various levels of the government. Understanding these two 
contrasting perspectives is important to understand various approaches to decentralize. In former 
perspective, the government is seen as benevolent (a Benthamite view) and decentralization is desirable 
because it brings it closer to the people. In latter perspective, the government is seen as malevolent and 
decentralization serves by disarming it.  The contrast in these two perspectives on virtues of 
decentralization is at the root of much of the confusion. Roots of these two decentralization 
 perspectives can be traced in the political thoughts of Rousseau and Montesquieu respectively. While 
Rousseau emphasized on virtues of bringing the government closer to the people, Montesquieu 
emphasized on virtues of limiting huge central government.  
 
Both Rousseau and Montesquieu favoured small governments but for different reasons. In a large 
country, according to Rousseau: “The rulers, overburdened with business, see nothing for themselves; 
clerks govern the state” (Rousseau 1762, pp.49-50).  In his Considerations on the Government of 
Poland, he offers the remedy by instructing the Poles to perfect and extend the authority of their 
provincial parliaments, or dietines, in order to avoid the dangers of large state size (Rousseau 1772, 
p.183). Thus he emphasized the importance of local representative bodies. Montesquieu on the other 
hand emphasized on virtues of preventing direct popular rule or majoritarian system for larger 
republics. Hamilton quoted Montesquieu at length to support the argument that splitting sovereignty 
between sub-unit and center would also protect individuals’ rights against abuse by authorities at 
either level (Federalist 9). It may be noted that the idea of decentralization as a theory of government 
where multiple veto points check the accrual of power in any single source was articulated during 
English Revolution. The activists including William Blackstone, Lord Bolingbroke, Major Cartwright, 
Edward Coke, William Godwin, Charles Grey, John Hardy, James Harrington, John Locke, John 
Milton, Robert Molesworth, Joseph Priestley, Algernon Sidney, and John Trenchard — collectively 
referred to as the Old Whig, Country, Commonwealth, or Dissenting traditions — formulated various 
facets of the decentralised model. [Brewer (1976), Foord (1964), Gunn (1969), Robbins (1959/1968)] 
William Blackstone’s theory of the mixed constitution with all parts in balance (which was derived 
from Aristotle) inspired the theory of the separation of powers, as articulated initially by Montesquieu 
and later by Madison. 
 
The two different perspectives on nature of government (benevolent vs malevolent) have produced in 
USA two opposing groups who differ in their value judgments on the issue of decentralization: 
Conservatives and Libertarians. Conservatives, stress the benefits of state and local autonomy, and 
devolution of power as the primary objective of decentralization. Libertarians by contrast believe that 
decentralization is meant to be a structural constraint on government. It disarms huge central 
government with monopolistic powers. The central purpose of decentralization in their view is to limit 
the power of government at all levels. Thus both the conservative (state sovereignty) and the libertarian 
(individual liberty) camps support decentralization but for entirely different reasons. Thus they are 
bound to differ in their prescriptions of decentralization instruments or tools.  
 
 
In fiscal federalism literature these two perspectives have crystallized in form of two theories: (a) 
Musgrave’s theory of Public finance and (b) Buchanan’s theory of Public Choice. Former models the 
government as a benevolent maximizer of social welfare while latter models the government as a self 
aggrandizing Leviathan. The difference in perspective directly leads to difference in their respective 
advocacies of the instruments to be used to work out fiscal decentralization. Former favours the 
instrument of intergovernmental transfers (revenue sharing) while latter favours tax separation 
(independent local taxation).  
 
It can be argued that a country where people by overwhelming majority express their concern 
regarding national issues and demand national goods and services  the design of decentralization will 
exhibit characteristics such as cooperation (centrally enforced) between levels of government, revenue 
sharing, and accountability of the local governments towards higher levels of government. This will be 
a top down approach. If however people are more concerned about local issues and demand local 
goods and services then the design of decentralization will exhibit characteristics such as dualism, tax 
 separation, and accountability of the local governments towards local constituents. This will be a 
bottom up approach. 
 
(b) Endogenous and Exogenous Imperatives: 
 
The move towards decentralization may be induced by some exogenous or endogenous systemic 
forces. Endogenous factors such as economic failures, emergence of educated urban middle classes and 
decline of traditional patron client relationships and exogenous factors such as absence of war and 
emergence of global networks can weaken the justifications for and desirability of authoritarian central 
government. This can on one hand tempt the deprived groups in a community to demand political 
power and on the other induce the central governments to accommodate this demand by paving way 
for democratic decentralization instead of combating this demand with force. In Indonesia, for instance, 
the historic fall of the Soeharto Regime (1966-1998) in May 1998 in the wake of the Asian economic 
crisis of 1997-98 altered the political framework and set the stage for demand for more revenue 
authority to SNGs. Local elites are now fully intent on taking direct control over local resources. 
Similarly, In Russia, the bargaining powers of officials at the two levels altered after ‘August 1998 
meltdown’ (the term used for financial and economic paralysis at the centre and consequent 
devaluation of Rouble on 17th August 1998). The implementation of IMF policies further weakened the 
internal support for the federation and discredited notions of ‘market democracy’. Governors, lacking 
confidence in central authority now exert greater independence from federal control and demand more 
revenue authority.  
 
Economic failure is one important factor for decline in the state’s credibility. Central governments have 
often failed to provide effective public services. Decentralization is then designed to escape from the 
traps of ineffective and inefficient governance, macroeconomic instability and inadequate economic 
growth. In East Asian countries decentralization is being designed to improve delivery of local services 
to large populations. Throughout post communist Central and Eastern Europe, decentralization is 
being designed to adjust to the process of transition from socialist system to market economy and 
democracy. 
 
In Latin America one of the important considerations for designing decentralization is to respond 
effectively to the political pressure from the people for democratization. This pressure is part of the 
historic “third wave of democracy” (Huntington, 1991) that began in the mid-1970s triggered a 
subsequent and equally profound wave of decentralization in the 1980s and 1990s.   
 
In some countries decentralization has been adopted as a path to national unity. In countries like 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Ethiopia, the aim behind designing decentralization is to meet the 
challenge of ethnic tensions. Decentralization in such countries is primarily aimed at keeping the 
centrifugal forces at bay by forging asymmetrical federations. In Mozambique and Uganda, 
decentralization has been the outcome of long civil wars and has allowed for greater participation of all 
former warring factions in the governance of the country. The aim of decentralization in such cases is to 
ease the frustration of the local aspirants of political power thereby curbing separatism by devolving 
more decision making powers to the sub central levels. In this sense decentralization is adopted as a 
strategy to maintain political stability, to provide an institutional mechanism for bringing opposition 
groups into a formal, ritualized bargaining process.   
 
Decentralization is sometimes designed merely to receive loans from international agencies. The design 
of decentralization in such cases can not be expected to aim at bringing about long term systemic 
reforms. Roy Bahl (1999) for instance observes, “When funding is brought as carrot, government 
 officials are stimulated by them to take a harder look at the decentralization issue. However, unless the 
government itself is enthusiastic, the harder look will not lead to meaningful policy reform and in fact 
will be quickly forgotten when the money is gone. Often implementation stage is never reached”. (p27). 
 
III. How to Decentralize?  
 
Decentralization is a mixture of administrative, fiscal and political functions and relationships. In 
design of decentralization all three must be included. Administrative decentralization occurs when 
agents in higher levels of government move to lower levels. Fiscal decentralization occurs when higher 
levels of government cede influence over budgets and financial decisions to lower levels. Democratic 
decentralization, occurs when resources, powers, and tasks are shifted to lower-level authorities who 
are independent and democratic. 
 
Quite frequently the question is raised as to how different forms of decentralization should be 
sequenced and synchronized. Whether political decentralization should precede or follow fiscal 
decentralization? (Sharma, 2005 c: 40-41).  There are scholarly works justifying both sides of the 
argument. Boex (2001) asserts,” An important precondition of fiscal decentralization is political 
decentralization.” (p,3). He argues that fiscal decentralization implicitly assumes that subnational 
governments have a certain degree of fiscal discretion and are accountable to their regional 
constituents. Nothing but political decentralization provides local governments with real decision 
making power. Wildasin (1995) also believes that political decentralization should come prior to fiscal 
decentralization. He argues that enhancing the responsiveness of local institutions, either by 
democratizing them or by making them more competitive is a task that warrants explicit consideration 
in the developing country context.  
 
On the other side of the spectrum lies the argument that bringing political decentralization prior to 
fiscal decentralization is like putting the cart before the horse. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) argue 
that local accountability is best ensured by devolving fiscal authority. Political decentralization in 
absence of fiscal decentralization will lead to local capture. Political decentralization may therefore 
simply transfer power from national to local elites. Thus the argument here is that institutional 
foundations for fiscal federalism, such as revenue-sharing arrangements and expenditure rules, should 
be in place before political decentralization and political liberalization begins.  Olivier Blanchard and 
Andrei Shleifer’s (2000) analysis suggest that federalism in Russia has failed precisely because political 
decentralization was put in place without adequate fiscal decentralization. 
 
From above it is clear that the issue of proper sequencing is an important issue but the one that has 
remained unresolved. The problem here seems to be with the question that researchers are raising. 
Instead of asking fiscal first or political first, the question should be ‘in what proportion’? How much 
political decentralization should be combined with what degree of fiscal decentralization? Thus the 
challenge of designing decentralization has been linked to a soufflé where all ingredients must be 
present in the right amounts and prepared in the right way to achieve success (Parker, 1995). The ‘right 
mix of the policy instruments’ however, must be determined while taking into account specific 
circumstances of the country concerned. It is not possible to propose a ‘decentralization model’ that 
would fit all the countries. To quote Prud’Homme (2001), “ They (policy makers) are like a composer 
writing a symphony for a number of instruments; the quality of the symphony will depend upon the 
melody written for each instrument and also upon the combination of  the many melodic lines.” 
 
It may be pointed out that in working out the right mix of various decentralization instruments one of 
the most contentious issue is ‘how subnational governments should be financed: by revenue sharing or 
 independent local taxation?’ On the basis of ‘decentralization instrument’ there are two strands in the 
literature that argue for two different approaches. One gives more weightage to devolution of tax 
authority as an instrument of decentralization and hold it crucial for subnational autonomy, the other 
gives more weight to intergovernmental transfers. It is generally upheld that subnational governments 
can be said to be fiscal sovereigns only if they depend on independent subnational taxation. Azfar et.al. 
(1999) in contrast give less importance to the devolution of tax power. In view of the authors, “The 
most sensible form of decentralization primarily devolve expenditures rather than taxes (using 
transparent and formula driven fiscal transfers) because devolution of power to tax can  create vertical 
externalities in terms of tax rates that are too high.”   
 
Two views on instruments for financing of decentralized units: (a) devolving revenue raising powers 
and (b) funding through intergovernmental transfers, echo two different perspectives. Former proposal 
has its roots in the concept of ‘dual federalism’ and the public choice perspective (Leviathan model) 
while the latter has its roots in the concept of ‘cooperative federalism’ and the public finance 
perspective (Benevolent social planner model). Though both views deserve due consideration, the 
solution however is not to be found in the antipodes. In fact the case for either policy instrument (own 
source revenues or intergovernmental transfers) cannot be overemphasized. Though both serve to 
supplement subnational funds, none of them can perform the vicarious function to compensate the lack 
of the other. Thus, one can not be seen as superior to the other. Matching revenue-raising powers to 
spending responsibilities is a commendable objective. It allows SNGs to tailor the supply of public 
goods to local citizens’ preferences and willingness to pay, and hence to be held accountable. But it 
cannot be stretched too far. From an ideal point of view, a case for perfect matching of revenue 
authority and expenditure responsibilities at the two levels can be made.  But in an imperfect world 
with spatial inequalities, majority voting procedures, and various constraints on SNGs on raising own 
revenues due to open nature of their economies and tax base mobility, transfers turn out to be the 
important policy instruments for moving closer to, if not fully achieving Breton’s (1965) perfect 
mapping or Olson’s (1969) fiscal equivalence.  
 
IV. How Much to Decentralize? 
 
Excessive decentralization, one that incapacitates the central government is a recipe for failure of 
democratic governance. Alexis de Tocqueville lived for several months in Switzerland in 1836 to study 
the impact of ‘excessive’ decentralization on quality of governance. After an in-depth study he 
observed, “I have developed such an utter disdain for the federal constitution of Switzerland, that I 
would unequivocally term it a league and not a federation. A government of that nature is certainly the 
weakest, the most impotent, the clumsiest and the least capable of leading its people anywhere except 
to anarchy that one could imagine. I am also struck by the lack of any vie politique in its population. The 
Kingdom of England is a hundred times more republican than this republic.” (Tocqueville 1952, 
Oeuvres Completes, Vol. XV, 1, p. 70-71). 
 
Recent empirical evidence supports this view.  Brazil is an example of an unbalanced federal system 
where states and municipalities have won. They dominate the union and compete among themselves 
in a disorganized and predatory fashion. Excessive decentralization has destabilized public sector and 
economy as a whole in Argentina while it has considerably lowered the quality of public services as in 
Latin America and Russia. It has hampered the government’s ability to respond to economic shocks in 
Philippines. What is more serious is that if ‘decentralization’ aspect is stretched to its extreme it can 
even encourage and incite  separatist tendencies as is happening in Italy. Wallace E. Oates (1999), has 
stated that in Italy the movement toward decentralization has gone so far as to encompass a serious 
proposal for the separation of the nation into two independent countries (p1120).  
  
The view here is simply that the center must not lose control. The nature of control however in the age 
of glocalization will be different from the kind of control exercised by the central governments in 
developing countries till mid 1980s. The emerging governance literature explores the kind of 
‘sophisticated control’ that is being considered more relevant than ever in context of glocalization. This 
new role of the center is based on changing paradigms of governance structure (as shown in Table 1).   
Table 1 : Governance Structure—20th Versus 21st century 
20th Century 21st Century 
 Unitary  Federal/Confederal 
 Centralized  Globalized and Localized 
 Center manages  Center leads 
 Bureaucratic  Participatory 
 Command and Control  Responsive and accountable to citizens 
 Input controls  Results matter 
 Top down accountability  Bottom up accountability 
 Internally dependent  Competitive 
 Closed and slow  Open and Quick 
 Intolerance of risk  Freedom to fail/succeed 
              Source : (Shah, 2004, p 4) 
 
Center’s new role will not be identical to the older one where central government played a strong-
control and commanding role. As governments restructure, role of centre should be that of 
“stewardship”. Peter Block argues that principles of stewardship bring a new understanding of 
accountability to each act of governance. (Block 1993, p. 27). In this concept, which is quite popular in 
literature of management and organization in United States, trust, service and accountability are 
emphasized. This concept has some novelty yet it underplays the significance of retaining an aura of 
control. Trust should be created without losing control and service should be rendered without 
attenuation of authority. In new role, the power and control are used not for coercive purposes but for 
creative purposes. The central government, being responsive in real sense of the term, stops using 
traditional control methods without loosing the ability to control; it just changes the modus operandi so as 
to make it more sophisticated. In new role, the central government uses its power not to pull the strings 
but to enable the regional governments to exercise the newly devolved responsibilities, powers and 
authorities.  In this process, national level institutions are strengthened to provide support to the 
regional levels rather than to make them subservient to the centre. 
 
In fact the changed global economic and political conditions are compelling central governments to 
look forward to more involvement of regional levels (some authors now prefer to use the word 
engagement) in development of national economic development strategies and thus are attempting to 
build local capacity. In emerging borderless world economy a newer federalism perspective will be 
called for, because in the times to come the functions such as “regulation of financial transactions, 
international trade, global environment and international migration, corporate taxation, stabilization, 
international conflict resolution, surveillance of governance conditions, transnational production, 
investment and technology transfer suppression of money laundering, drug smuggling and terrorism 
will gradually pass upwards i.e. beyond nation states”. Central level of government will perform tasks 
such as “ oversight and technical assistance to subnational governments, macroeconomic coordination, 
social safety nets, skill enhancement for international competitiveness, social and environmental policy 
through international agreements” (Shah, 2004). The task ahead to ensure this is to strengthen national 
level institutions. A real test of the strength of the institution is the ability to successfully meld two 
 goals: central authority and sub-central engagement and empowerment to ensure good democratic 
governance. 
 
New literature on political economy of fiscal federalism however, goes far beyond the earlier issues. 
Now the case is for the center to assume sophisticated styles of remaining ‘in charge’ (stewardship/ 
leadership) and constructing such support structures, processes and national institutions which create 
enabling environment (in which subnational autonomy is tolerated and treasured), build local capacity 
and provide appropriate incentives for the subantional governments to behave responsibly while 
allowing center to perform its new role in changed political and economic conditions. The best design 
for decentralization, in the last analysis however, will vary according to circumstances and situations. 
 
V. How Fast to Decentralize? 
 
Another aspect related to policy design is the concern regarding the pace of the decentralization 
process. There are arguments favoring “incremental decentralization” as well as “big bang 
decentralization”. Those who support slow, incremental or partial decentralization draw attention 
toward probable downside risks of decentralization. Most significant among all is the concern with 
decline in service delivery on account of ‘capture by local elites’ and low technical capabilities of local 
government. It is feared that (a) the possibility is always there that the locally elected officials will 
spend the money in their own interest rather than interest of their constituents and (b) what is gained 
in better information (as the argument goes in favour of decentralization) may be lost in lower technical 
competence/capacity and in lack of economies of scale. In addition to this the suggestion to keep the 
pace slow also come on the basis of deeply entrenched historical basis that centralization legacy creates 
to the disadvantage of ongoing process of decentralization. Thus Prud’Homme advices, “A century of 
centralization cannot (and should not) be overruled overnight…. (Decentralization) will remain on 
agenda for many years” (Prud’Homme, 2001). Concerns with the risks associated with decentralization 
have in fact prompted some Latin American and Caribbean countries to favour slow, incremental and 
piecemeal decentralization. Programs geared to strengthening subnational government technical 
capacity have been implemented in every country in the region. Incremental approach has also taken 
the form of micro monitored earmarking (for instance, in Mexican approach to sector decentralization). 
Econometric results reported in a World Bank Report [Burki et al. 1999] suggest that fast 
decentralization normally leads to higher overall public expenditures and serious problems in 
macroeconomic management.  
 
On the other hand arguments such as bureaucratic resistance and interests and attitudes of powerful 
stakeholders (which could be seen as the outcome of centralization legacy) have been used to argue for 
exactly opposite approach to decentralization i.e. the big bang approach. The proponents of big bang 
approach draw attention towards the constraints imposed by anti decentralization coalitions which, it 
is expressed, can only be overcome if a political breakthrough is made by large scale decentralization 
rather than by moderate decentralization. It is feared that policy reform of any sort will be confronted 
by vested interests such as central bureaucrats and local governments aiming to protect their privileges, 
which could install such a reform or call for a major setback (Rodrik 1996). Alternatively, different 
political groups that are affected by different policy reforms may form a coalition to halt these reforms 
altogether (Wei, 1997). Taking such concerns as justifications, Motohiro Sato (2002) suggests, “In reality 
therefore, economic reform plan must be accompanied by proper tactics to overcome political 
oppositions from stakeholders within and outside of a central government”. The author shows that 
how (against intuition) large scale decentralization may turn out to be more successful in forming a 
political majority of pro decentralization and thus overcoming the political constraint. It is pointed out 
that a small scale reform will always remain constrained by a coalition of rent seeker governments and 
 thus a theoretical model is provided to prove the case for “big push” or “big bang” approach for 
decentralization.   
 
Keeping in view the above arguments the bottom line statement one can arrive at is the assertion that 
pace (along with design, sequencing and proper mix) should be “optimal” because each approach has 
its own costs and benefits. Optimal pace is more than highly cautious approach of gradualism which 
fails to replace even the most inefficient institutions. It is on the other hand less enthusiastic than the 
shock therapy designed to replace the old institutions all at once. Thus it aims at getting the best of 
both worlds.  The optimality however, must be ascertained on case by case basis in accordance with the 
specificities and peculiarities of the country in question. Wei and Lian (1998) study the economics and 
political economy of optimal scale of reforms. The authors argue that if agents in an economy are 
heterogeneous in terms of their subjective discount rates, the politically-determined reform speed may 
be lower in a democracy than in an economy with a benevolent dictator. Prud’Homme(2001) observes 
that each country must find its own model that best fits its specific social, economic, political, cultural, 
historical and geographical conditions. Lessons in theory and study of international experience can be 
useful for defining such a model for a particular country.  
 
VI. Conclusion:  
 
The paper has made an attempt to situate the debate on decentralization in context of glocalization. The 
context of glocalization has pronounced the dilemma of balancing the contrasting forces of 
centralization and decentralization. Research shows that glocalization is generating tendencies in both 
directions (centralization and decentralization) with the aim of providing good governance and a 
stable, secure and just government The new context has raised new questions regarding drive, design, 
degree and pace of decentralization. It has been argued that there can be different motivations behind 
choosing decentralization policies. In fact there are contrasting value judgments on –‘why to 
decentralize’. These worldviews influence policymakers’ views on ‘how to decentralize’? How 
decentralization is designed and the pace with which the policies are implemented depend on the goals 
that policy makers seek to achieve. However, certain broad guidelines can be outlined to ensure that 
decentralized institutions do not provide perverse incentives. In fact the changed global and local 
world economy calls for a newer perspective on decentralization. Seven components of designing 
decentralization are crucial for its success (Sharma, 2005c: 39). These are:  
1. Finance should follow function: Revenue raising authority must be linked, at the margin to the 
service provision responsibilities.  
2. Informed public opinion: There should be local access to right information to enable the local 
community to develop meaningful public opinion and decide priorities.   
3. Mechanisms for making local priorities known must be put in place.   
4. Credible incentives for people to participate: Writers on institutional economics have long 
observed that people’s willingness to participate varies according to their perception of how much 
impact such participation will have (Hirschman, 1970; North, 1990; Ostrom et al. 1993).  
5. Adherence to local priorities: There should be compelling incentives for politicians to be 
responsive and accountable.  
6. Appropriate incentives for sub national governments to maintain fiscal responsibility: It is 
argued that destabilization effects of decentralization arose mainly from inappropriate incentives 
than any problem inherent in decentralization (Spahn 1997) including soft budget constraints.  
7. Instruments of decentralization should be designed to support political objectives: The 
instruments of decentralization at the disposal of a policy maker are:   
(i) Legal institutional framework.  
(ii) Structure of service delivery responsibilities.  
 (iii) Allocation of various taxes among different levels of the government.  
(iv) Intergovernmental transfers. 
(v) Central government controls and constraints upon sub national borrowing  
(vi)Local government election rules.  
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